The Libor Scandal: A Need For Revised National And International Reforms And Regulations by Girasa, Roy J. & Kraus, Richard J.
North East Journal of Legal Studies 
Volume 32 Fall 2014 Article 4 
Fall 2014 
The Libor Scandal: A Need For Revised National And International 
Reforms And Regulations 
Roy J. Girasa 
rgirasa@pace.edu 
Richard J. Kraus 
rkraus@pace.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb 
Recommended Citation 
Girasa, Roy J. and Kraus, Richard J. (2014) "The Libor Scandal: A Need For Revised National And 
International Reforms And Regulations," North East Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 32 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.fairfield.edu/nealsb/vol32/iss1/4 
This item has been accepted for inclusion in DigitalCommons@Fairfield by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@Fairfield. It is brought to you by DigitalCommons@Fairfield with permission from the rights-
holder(s) and is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this item in any way that is 
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses, you need to obtain 
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license 
in the record and/or on the work itself. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@fairfield.edu. 
89 / Vol 32 / North East Journal of Legal Studies 
 
THE LIBOR SCANDAL: A NEED FOR REVISED 





Roy J. Girasa* 





     Few individuals or even major investors are aware of the 
London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), a little-known 
activity that profoundly affects local and world finances. The 
total value of securities and loans affected by LIBOR is 
approximately $800 trillion dollars annually. In contrast, the 
global Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is approximately $69.65 
trillion dollars and the US GDP is around $15 trillion. Until the 
global economy suffered a great loss commencing in 2007, 
little attention was paid to the gross LIBOR abuses by banks, 
securities firms, and other financial institutions in the financial 
markets. This article examines the LIBOR rate manipulation 
which has led to investigations by the United States 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the 
United Kingdom Financial Services Authority (FSA). 
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Significant fines were assessed by these governmental 
agencies. Civil lawsuits by affected legal persons also resulted. 
This article concludes that, in the absence of responsible 
actions by financial businesses, antifraud regulations must be 
strengthened and enforced, even though the manner and 
mechanisms of such regulations have not yet been finalized.  
 
LIBOR: THE SELF-DETERMINED INTERBANK 
INTEREST RATE  
 
     LIBOR establishes the interest rate that banks charge each 
other for short term loans. It indicates the average rate that a 
LIBOR contributor bank would have to pay to obtain 
unsecured funding in the London interbank market for a 
designated time frame in reasonable market size for a given 
maturity in a given currency. It is set by the British Bankers 
Association (BBA) each business day between 11:00am and 
11:10am London time. Each of the designated contributor 
banks is asked the question: “At what rate could you borrow 
funds, were you to do so by asking for and then accepting 
inter-bank offers in a reasonable market size just prior to 
11:00am?” It is the lowest rate that would be charged to the 
particular bank given its credit and liquidity risk profile. It is 
also the perceived rate because as the contributor bank need not 
have actually borrowed unsecured funds from other banks. The 
LIBOR rates are quoted based on annualized interest rates 
which can vary significantly for a particular bank borrowing 
funds on a particular date.  
 
     LIBOR rates are important because they assist setting rates 
for a wide range of financial products from pensions to fixed 
and adjustable mortgage rates, currencies, mutual funds, and 
derivatives. 1 
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     The British Bankers Association (BBA) name does not 
disclose the fact that the Association is composed of 18 “panel 
banks” from all over the globe. The banks, setting the rates 
since 1986, are selected based on their scale of market activity, 
credit rating, and perceived expertise in the particular currency 
utilized by them. For example, the following banks are the 
Association’s contributor banks for the US Dollar: Bank of 
America, JP Morgan Chase, Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 
Ltd, Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays Bank plc, Rabobank, 
BNP Paribas, Royal Bank of Canada, Citibank NA, Societe 
Generale, Credit Agricole CIB, Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corporation, Credit Suisse, Norinchukin Bank, Deutsche Bank 
AG, Royal Bank of Scotland Group, HSBC, and UBS AG.2   
 
     Each day at noon London time, the BBA agent Thompson 
Reuters distributes maturity rates globally to approximately 
300,000 recipients with respect to five currencies with seven 
maturities: overnight, spot/next, one week, one month, two 
months, three months, six months, and twelve months.3 These 
rate reports were commenced in 1986 in response to the 
creation of sophisticated new market instruments, including 
interest rate swaps, foreign currency options, and forward rate 
agreements.  
     The five currencies reported by Thomson Reuters include 
the Swiss Francs, the Euro, the Pounds Sterling, the Japanese 
Yen, and the US Dollars. 4     
     The LIBOR rates, however, were used to obtain profit for 
financial institutions in a fraudulent manner rather than merely 
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THE LIBOR RATE BANK MANIPULATION   
 
Trader and Bank Manipulations Discovered  
 
     In 2012, investigators for the United States CFTC and the 
United Kingdom FSA discovered financial trader and bank 
executive malfeasance before, during and after the 2007-2009 
financial crises. Traders and bank executives acted together to 
produce false LIBOR numbers. One financial trader  joked and 
offered favors, indicating that “Coffees will be coming your 
way” with respect to an exchange for a manipulated number; 
another trader stated he owed another trader ‘big time” for the 
made up cost of borrowing funds and a third wrote himself to 
“Ask for High 6M Fix.” The manipulations produced great 
personal gain for the traders because even small fluctuations of 
the LIBOR rates produce millions of dollars of gains for the 
perpetrator daily. Bank executives in turn concealed the trader 
operations because they feared a run on their banks if the 
submissions indicated a higher than average borrowing rate. 
Banks also had incentives to falsify the cost of borrowing 
because a higher than average borrowing cost might signal 
weakness on their balance sheets which, in turn would 
exacerbate their difficulties. 5   
 
     In addition, the banks and their executives acted together to 
falsify the LIBOR rate statements. Traders’ manipulations 
affected the LIBOR rate to the extent of 1-2 basis points, but 
the false submissions by banks affected the rates by 30-40 basis 
points.6  
 
The 2008 Geithner Warning 
 
     For a number of years prior to the 2012 public disclosure of 
the rate manipulation, questions were raised concerning its 
possibility. In testimony before the United States House of 
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Representatives, Timothy Geithner, the then Secretary of the 
Treasury, stated that he, as President of the Federal Reserve of 
New York, warned British authorities in 2008 of possible 
irregularities. In an email to Mervyn King, Governor of the 
Bank of England, Geithner warned that the BBA should not 
have the right to regulate LIBOR because that association was 
not strong enough to oversee its rate setting methodology. 
Geithner’s testimony stated: "In the detailed recommendations 
we gave to the British, we identified a series of specific things 
that would make it untenable for this rate to be affected by the 
banks' incentive to lower their reported cost of funds. We gave 
them very specific detailed changes for doing that. If those had 
been adopted sooner, you would limit this risk going forward." 
He further stated the reforming LIBOR had to be accomplished 
internationally.7  
 
     Among the recommendations made by Geithner, with the 
apparent concurrence of US banks, was the establishment and 
publication of best practices by the BBA for calculating and 
reporting rates including the requirement that external auditors 
confirm adherence to these best practices and attest to the 
accuracy of banks’ LIBOR rates. Geithner further suggested 
the increase in size and the broadening of the composition of 
the US Dollar panel with additional US banks on the panel 
such as State Street, Northern Trust, and the Bank of New 
York. He proposed a second US dollar LIBOR fixing for the 
US market to capture rates when the US market is active. 
Geithner recommended changes which included a) the 
specification of transaction size which would be adjusted 
flexibly over time so as to reflect significant changes in market 
conditions; b) the reduction of the number of quoted maturities; 
c) the report of only the LIBOR maturities for which there is a 
direct benefit; and d) the elimination of the incentive to 
misreport by randomly selecting a subset of 16 banks from 
which the trimmed average rate would be calculated.8  
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     Secretary Geithner was criticized broadly by Congressional 
Representatives for not revealing his concerns to the 
committees of Congress. Representative Jeb Hensarling 
claimed that Geithner treated the LIBOR manipulation “as a 
curiosity, or something akin to jaywalking, as opposed to 
highway robbery”. Other Representatives stated that, 
notwithstanding LIBOR difficulties known to the Treasury 
Department, the Federal Reserve continued to use LIBOR in a 
number of financial rescue programs. Geithner defended his 
role alleging: “We were in the position of investors all around 
the world….” “We had to make a choice about what was the 
best rate. It was a rate that was vulnerable to manipulation, but 
we tried to initiate reform with the British.”9 
 
     The Bank of England confirmed that it had received the 
Geithner communication in June 2008. The Bank alleged that it 
had notified the BBA of the recommendations. The Bank also 
noted that there were a number of emails between its staff and 
the BBA, but apparently little or no action was taken as a result 
of the suggestions made in the emails. Both the Bank of 
England and the New York Federal Reserve Bank alleged that 
they failed to act because they had no responsibility for 
oversight of LIBOR which was left exclusively to the BBA. 
The BBA claimed that it did publish a paper in November of 
2008 which suggested changes in its governance structures and 
disciplinary procedures as well as better scrutiny and analysis 
in setting the rate.10The UK Parliament subsequently passed 
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RESULTS OF THE LIBOR SCANDAL: 






     The first casualty of the LIBOR scandal was the 300-year-
old Barclays Bank (Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, and 
Barclays Capital Inc.). After many complaints, the US 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued a 
June 27, 2012 Order settling the charges instituted against the 
Bank. The Order noted that the Bank, since at least 2005, 
repeatedly attempted to manipulate the rate and made false, 
misleading or knowingly inaccurate submissions concerning 
two global benchmark interest rates to the BBA and to the 
European Banking Federation’s Interbank Offered Rate 
(EURIBOR).11 According to the Order’s findings of fact, 
Barclays' conduct involved multiple desks, traders, offices and 
currencies, including the US Dollar, the Pound Sterling, the 
Euro, and the Yen. Its daily LIBOR submissions were made at 
the requests of the Bank’s swaps traders who attempted to 
affect the official published LIBOR to benefit the Bank’s 
derivatives trading positions. Its swaps traders coordinated with 
and aided traders at other banks to influence LIBOR 
submissions.12   
 
     The Order noted that, during the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, Barclays lowered its LIBOR submissions in order to 
manage perceived negative market perceptions that the Bank 
had liquidity problems based on its high submissions in 
comparison to lower submissions of other banks with respect to 
the cost of borrowing unsecured funds. The Bank’s failure to 
have proper supervision of its trading desks, especially that of 
its swaps dealers, permitted senior managers to engage in false 
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submissions. Barclays routinely based its LIBOR and 
EURIBOR submissions on its traders’ requests, rather than 
reflecting the actual cost of borrowing, in order to benefit the 
Bank’s derivatives trading positions. It lowered its submissions 
to reflect the lower costs of borrowing submitted by other 
banks in an endeavor so as to not appear to be an outlier bank.   
 
     Barclays Bank consented to the imposition of a $200 
million penalty by the CFTC as well as to $160 million penalty 
to the Fraud Section of the US Department of Justice, and to 
implement the following procedures: 
• Make submissions based on specified factors with 
Barclays’ transactions being given the greatest weight, 
subject to specified adjustments and considerations; 
• Implement firewalls to prevent improper 
communications including between traders and 
submitters; 
• Prepare and retain certain documents concerning 
submissions, and retain relevant communications; 
• Implement auditing, monitoring and training measures 
concerning its submissions and related processes;  
• Make regular reports to the CFTC concerning 
compliance with the terms of the Order; 
• Use best efforts to encourage the development of 
rigorous standards for benchmark interest rates; and 
• Continue to cooperate with the CFTC.13 
 
The scandal led to the replacement of its longstanding 
senior executives including its Chairman, Marcus Agius, CEO 
Bob Diamond, and COO Jerry Del Missier.14 The public and 
governmental call for retribution may have made Barclays 
Bank an easy target but, as noted below, it was not the only 
bank to be punished for its wrongdoing.  
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UBS (formerly Union Bank of Switzerland):  
 
     The largest bank in Switzerland, UBS, was ordered to pay 
1.4 billion Swiss francs (US $1.5 billion) to US, UK, and Swiss 
regulators for its involvement in the rate-rigging scandal 
concerning LIBOR submissions. These penalties amount to 
three times those imposed upon Barclays Bank. 15 The sum 
includes £160 million ($260 million) to the UK FSA, and 59 
million francs in estimated profits to the Swiss Financial 
Market Supervisory Authority. The UK financial regulator 
found some 2,000 documented requests by UBS traders to alter 
interest borrowing rate submissions involving 45 or more bank 
personnel over a 6-year period. The UBS employees worked 
with interdealer brokers whom they bribed to manipulate Yen 
LIBOR submissions by other banks. The UBS traders were 
able to have other persons submit higher and lower rates to 
LIBOR to benefit their proprietary trading positions. The UBS 
branch in Japan pled guilty to one count of wire fraud for 
manipulation of the Yen LIBOR. Its operation in Japan was 
only modestly affected in that it paid a fine equal to about its 
three weeks revenue in Japan. The Japanese UBS operation 
was also prohibited in participating in the Tokyo interbank 
derivative market for a week, and had to strengthen its 
compliance and internal controls.16   
 
     The FSA also noted one specific example in which a UBS 
trader agreed with a fellow trader that he would attempt to 
manipulate UBS’s submissions in small drops in order to avoid 
arousing suspicion of regulators. The trader stated: “if you keep 
6s [6 month JPY LIBOR rate] unchanged today…I will f…ing 
do one humongous deal with you… Like a 50,000 buck deal, 
whatever…I need you to keep it as low as possible…if you do 
that…I’ll pay you, you know, 50,000 dollars, 100,000 
dollars…whatever you want…I’m a man of my word.”17 
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Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS): 
 
     In a situation similar to the UBS controversy above, the UK 
FSA, the US CFTC and the US Department of Justice fined 
RBS £290 million ($610 million) for its manipulative practices. 
The sum was to be paid from moneys taken back from paid 
bonuses and future bonuses of executives of the Bank. RBS 
traders colluded with other traders in London, Singapore, 
Tokyo, and elsewhere to fix LIBOR rates in hundreds of trades 
involving the Japanese Yen and Swiss francs from 2006-2010. 
The prosecution of RBS was based on its failure to have and 
enforce compliance measures to detect and prevent fraudulent 
activity. Investigators noted that derivatives traders and 
submitters worked together at the same desk thereby 
facilitating potential conflicts of interest. The fine was 
significantly lower than that imposed on UBS because 82 
percent of its shares are owned by the British government.18 
Investigators also noted that other banks on the LIBOR panel 
were engaged in rate manipulation.19   
 
Rabobank (Cooperatieve Centrale Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank 
B.A).: 
 
      In October, 2013, US and European regulators fined 
Rabobank of the Netherlands the sum of €774 million ($1 
billion) for alleged manipulation of LIBOR and EURIBOR 
currency rates by some 30 staff members. The bank was also 
found to have manipulated the Yen LIBOR causing it to close 
it Tokyo’s offices leaving only a representative branch therein. 
The regulators noted that the bank had filed to act in the light 
of one of its employees having told an internal audit group of 
yen manipulations in 2009. In 2006, a Rabobank derivatives 
trader on a number of occasions asked the bank’s money 
market desk in London that supervised rate submitters for rates 
favoring his position. The desk head of the London office said 
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to the trader that “I am fast turning into your LIBOR bitch.”20  
In addition, a criminal information was filed in the US District 
Court for the District of Columbia charging the bank with wire 
fraud for the said rate manipulation but deferred prosecution 
pending the bank’s cooperation with the Department of Justice 
in its ongoing investigation of LIBOR manipulation.21    
 
Additional Investigations:  
 
     The LIBOR scandal has resulted in investigations of 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, ICAP, and JP Morgan 
Chase. A financial trader at Citigroup in the Bank’s Tokyo 
office, for example, needed assistance with respect to the 
Japanese Yen. He contacted a RBS broker-trader and asked for 
an artificially low LIBOR estimate of the Yen for the next day. 
The Citigroup trader indicated his appreciation for any favors 
in this regard, and the RBS trader responded affirmatively. 
That message and other similar type messages led prosecutors 
in the US to indict the Citigroup trader for conspiracy, wire 
fraud, and other charges. He was also arrested in England at a 
later date. The Japanese Services Agency suspended briefly 
Citigroup’s Global Markets Group from Yen trading. JP 
Morgan Chase and the Bank of America are presently under 
investigation by the US, UK, Canadian, Swiss, and other 
financial regulators.22  
 
     The UK Financial Conduct Authority stated in December, 
2013 that it will also fine individual traders from a half dozen 
firms including Barclays of more than £100,000 ($US 
$160,000). Traders contesting the fines may have their cases 
heard by the Authority’s internal tribunal. A former UBS 
trader, Tom Hayes, who had been scheduled to enter a plea of 
guilty in a London court instead decided to enter a “Not 
Guilty” plea with two other traders. His trial is scheduled for 
January, 2015. In December, 2013, the US Department of 
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Justice indicted Hayes concerning LIBOR rate manipulations 
by conspiring with employees of JPMorgan Chase, HSCH, 




The United Kingdom:  
 
     The criminal fines imposed on Barclays Bank, described 
above, were only the beginning of its financial difficulties 
rather than the end of its financial exposure. Guardian Care 
Homes commenced a lawsuit for £70 million (US $113 
million) concerning the alleged miss-selling of interest rate 
hedging products based on LIBOR rates.24 London’s Court of 
Appeals ruled in August, 2013 that its lawsuit against the 
Barclays Bank, which was the first bank to acknowledge rate 
manipulation, as well as a lawsuit against Deutsche Bank by 
India’s Unitech, could proceed to trial.25 This admission has 
led some commentators to demand equal investigation and 
enforcement against other banks which similarly colluded to 
artificially set LIBOR. 
 
The United States: 
 
      There are pending US civil lawsuits, including a class 
action brought in August 2012 on behalf of investors in Alaska, 
Wyoming, North Dakota, and some 20 other states. The March 
29, 2013 Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York decision, In re LIBOR-Based Financial Instruments 
Antitrust Litigation, however, indicated that a number of 
difficulties may arise in civil actions against the financial 
institutions and their senior executives for LIBOR 
manipulation alleged injuries.26  
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     The federal Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation 
assigned District Court Judge Naomi Buchwald to coordinate 
and consolidate pretrial proceedings with respect to a number 
of civil lawsuits commenced nationally involving LIBOR 
manipulation. The defendants had filed motions to dismiss with 
respect to the four categories of plaintiffs: (1) over-the-counter 
traders; (2) exchange-based traders; (3) bondholders; and (4) 
the Charles Schwab company. All but the fourth were class 
action plaintiffs. A stay was entered by the court with respect 
to all new complaints pending its decision.  
 
     The court addressed the defendants’ motions to dismiss. The 
complaints alleging federal antitrust violations were dismissed 
for failure to establish “antitrust injury” defined as “an injury 
that results from an anticompetitive aspect of defendants’ 
conduct.” Although the plaintiffs had alleged that the 
defendants conspired to suppress LIBOR over a three-year 
period causing injury to the plaintiffs, nevertheless, they failed 
to allege that the injuries resulted from any harm to 
competition. Bank submissions to LIBOR were not in 
themselves competitive and the plaintiffs failed to allege that 
the conduct of the defendants had an anticompetitive effect in 
any market in which the defendants compete.  
 
     With respect to the plaintiffs’ complaint of market 
manipulation, the court determined that the plaintiffs had 
adequately pleaded their claims, and would not be dismissed 
for failure to state a course of action. But the claims were time-
barred because there were numerous articles published in April 
and May of 2008 in prominent publications that should have 
made the plaintiffs aware of the defendants’ commodities 
manipulation claims that were based on contracts entered into 
between August 2007 and May 29, 2008. Plaintiffs’ claims for 
contracts entered into between April 15, 2009 and May, 2010 
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may or may not survive the statute of limitations pending 
further amendment to their complaints. 
 
     Plaintiffs’ complaints concerning RICO (Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act)27 violations were 
dismissed. The predicate acts of mail and wire fraud could 
have been part of a claim for securities fraud and would thus be 
barred by the PSLRA (Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
of 1995).28 Because the fraudulent actions alleged took place in 
England, RICO would not be applicable; the Act applies only 
to domestic enterprises. The additional complaints alleging 
state-law claims alleging antitrust violations were also 
dismissed for lack of antitrust injury as well as the exchange-
based New York common law unjust enrichment because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege any relationship between them and the 
defendants.  
 
     Assuming the decision is not reversed on appeal in whole or 
in part, it appears that civil litigation claims will have 
substantial difficulties in overcoming motions to dismiss, 




Suggested Rate Setting Mechanisms: 
 
A number of alternative suggestions for the replacement of 
LIBOR have arisen:  
 
• Members of the European Repo Council consisting of 
a number of the leading banks globally, including 
Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank, requested the 
European Central Bank to find a new way of 
calculating interest rates for inter-bank unsecured 
loans. The Council suggested that the Central Bank set 
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up a benchmark based on actual “secured market” 
trades (bonds and other assets used as security for 
loans). The secured market alternative to the unsecured 
interbank market should be used to set the price for 
trillions of euros for financial products including home 
loans and derivatives.29 
• The former Chairman of the US Federal Reserve 
Board, Ben Bernanke, in testimony before United 
States Congressional committees, suggested two 
market-determined replacement alternatives, namely 
(1) use of repo rates, i.e., repurchase agreements 
defined as collateralized lending transactions whereby 
one party agrees to sell securities to a second party 
against a transfer of funds while the other party agrees 
to repurchase the said or equivalent securities at a 
specific price in the future;30 or (2) Overnight Interest 
Swap (OIS) rates between banks, which exchange an 
overnight interest rate for a short-term interest rate.31  
• The former Chairman of the US CFTC, Gary Gensler, 
stated that the current international financial 
benchmark for setting rates on mortgages, car loans, 
and futures market trading is not sustainable. He 
quoted Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of 
England who said of LIBOR in 2008: “It is, in many 
ways, the rate at which banks do not lend to each 
other.”  Gensler noted that there has been a significant 
structural change in the manner in which market 
participants finance their balance sheets and trading 
positions, from borrowing unsecured toward 
borrowings that are secured by posting collateral. The 
2008 financial crisis and the 2010 debt crisis and the 
downgrading of banks’ ratings have cause unsecured 
borrowings to diminish substantially. Basel III 
international capital rules, which now include an asset 
correlation factor that requires additional capital when 
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a bank is exposed to another bank, have also reduced 
outlays for unsecured borrowings. Coupled with the 
revelations of bank manipulations, Gensler suggested 
that it is time to undertake possible alternative 
mechanisms which include overnight index swaps 
rates, benchmark rates based on actual short-term 
collateralized financing, or a new standard based on 
government borrowing rates.32 
• Use of the Eurodollar rate which is published daily by 
the Federal Reserve Board as published by Bloomberg 
ICAP Eurodollar screen at 9:30 A.M. EST.33 
• Rates based on actual trades rather than estimates. 
Those opposed to such computations allege that many 
banks cannot borrow from other banks and thus there 
are no LIBOR transactions. Three-to-six month 
transactions are virtually impossible for certain 
currencies.34    
• Additional alternatives for determining rates for 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMS) include the linking 
of ARMS to Treasuries; “effective” federal funds rate; 
and general collateral finance repurchase agreements.35  
 
United Kingdom Legislative Action – The Financial Services 
Act of 2012:  
 
     The revelations of impropriety in the LIBOR rate setting 
mechanism brought about UK Parliamentary action. At the 
behest of the Chancellor, The Financial Services Act of 2012 
was enacted. The then existing Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) was abolished and replaced by a single financial 
services regulator and two new regulatory bodies, to wit, the 
Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), a subsidiary of the 
Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
The effective date of the transition is April 1, 2013.36 The 
purposes for the new Authorities are to “carry forward our 
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philosophy of outcomes-based regulation, intensive firm 
supervision and credible deterrence.”37 The role of the PRA is 
to regulate the UK financial system of all deposit-taking 
institutions and investment banks. The FCA’s role is to 
regulate the wholesale and retail financial markets and their 
infrastructure and all financial firms not regulated by the 
PRA.38 Martin Wheatley, the Chief Executive of FCA, 
produced an 85 page Wheatley Review final report concerning 
the LIBOR system and concluded that the system should 
continue. 39 
 
• LIBOR should be reformed rather than replaced as a 
benchmark; 
• Transaction data should be explicitly used to support 
LIBOR submissions; and  
• Market participants should continue to play a 
significant role in the production and oversight of 
LIBOR.40 
 
Transfer of Oversight of LIBOR:  
 
     As a result of the failure of the British Bankers’ Association 
to regulate LIBOR and the recommendations of the Wheatley 
Review, oversight of LIBOR was transferred from the BBA to 
a regulator to oversee the rates set forth by the BBA.41 
 
     Will reforming LIBOR instead of replacing it resolve the 
problem of rate manipulation? At least one commentator 
observed that, by the continued use of LIBOR setters by banks, 
the FCA will simply discard submissions it deems too high or 
too low and inadvertently create a rate manipulation of its own 
making, and subject to possible future manipulation. The 
increased layer of rate inspection, however, by a non-industry 
party will certainly produce some guards against fraudulent 
manipulations.42 




     In a 2014 Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) Global 
Market Sentiment Survey of more than 6,500 members, more 
than half of its members (54 percent) believed that there was a 
failure of an ethical culture within financial firms. This failure 
has led to a lack of trust in the industry. A majority of members 
believed that there should be increased global coordination to 
monitor systemic risks to avoid future financial crises; greater 
transparency respecting trades; improved corporate 
governance; and adherence to governmental rules and 
regulations.43   
 
     The world of finance is immensely complicated. Even so-
called sophisticated investors lack sufficient knowledge of 
derivatives, swaps, and other instruments of finance. It is 
difficult to comprehend that reputable international banks and 
financial institutions have engaged in rate manipulation almost 
without fear of discovery. Their malfeasance has consisted 
alternatively of corporate decisions to manipulate rates to boost 
their standing; by their failure to have safeguards against 
manipulation; or by their failure to supervise rogue employees 
who were able to profit extensively by such manipulation. 
Scandals in the financial industry continue to abound: 
corporate ratings organizations such as Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s, and Fitch Ratings have allegedly given higher than 
merited ratings to corporate financial institutions in order to 
receive their business. The result of these and other scandals 
precipitated the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act44 and other 
national and international legislation, including regulatory 
investigations by affected government commissions. These 
investigations and their resulting fines have in turn 
substantially raised the costs of providing financial services.  
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     Unfortunately, the LIBOR scandal was revealed after the 
promulgation of Dodd-Frank and thus had no specific 
provisions relating to the scandal. At best, the Act expanded 
the powers of the US CFTC in its regulations of derivatives. It 
is highly unlikely that Dodd-Frank will be amended to cover 
the additional manifestations of the LIBOR scandal. The House 
of Representatives, in fact, has sought to repeal the Act.45 
Financial institutions complain extensively of being 
overburdened by governmental regulations. But unless they 
collectively and individually act responsibly, governments 
have little choice other than greater oversight and prosecution 
for such malfeasance. 
     Although the task presents great challenges, the ordered 
enforcement of national and international antifraud regulation 
must occur. The United Kingdom Financial Services Act, the 
extension of Dodd Frank to govern disclosure of LIBOR rate 
setting and continuing national and international initiatives to 
enforce due diligence in the setting of these rates are absolutely 
necessary to avoid illegal actions which affect individual 
persons and corporate entities. Suggested rate setting 
mechanisms must be continually revised and diligently 
enforced. 
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